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ABSTRACT
This article examines a current circuit split regarding the constitutionality of
restrictive occupational licensing schemes that exist only for protectionist
purposes. The Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles v. Giles and the Tenth Circuit case
Powers v. Harris, are cases that revolve around similar facts but reach opposite
outcomes. The two cases profile state funeral industry licensing restrictions. In
both cases, the plaintiffs were penalized for selling caskets without state-issued
licenses.
Though licensing restrictions in the funeral industry affect most Americans
as consumers, the scope of this circuit split reaches into nearly every industry.
When businesses lobby governments to enact legislation, they establish large, often
insurmountable barriers to competition. Drawing from scholarly work in this area,
this article argues that protectionist licensing schemes produce numerous negative
effects and infringe upon individuals’ right to earn an honest living. This article
also looks to a new funeral case that has emerged, which will hopefully have a
positive impact on the case law surrounding protectionist occupational licensing
schemes.
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“[W]hile baseball may be the national pastime of the citizenry, dishing out special
economic benefits to certain in-state industries remains the favored pastime of state
and local governments.” – Tenth Circuit Judge Tacha, Powers v. Harris 1
I. INTRODUCTION
How much training would you like someone to have before she sells you
flowers? A few years of floral design school? Perhaps an apprenticeship with a
master florist? Should she have passed a state exam on floral design? Would you
require a training program by law? Do lousy bouquets actually create health and
safety issues? Though this may seem like a silly question, more and more
occupations require workers to have a state-granted license in order to perform
their jobs. Though “in the 1950s . . . about one in twenty Americans needed the
government’s blessing to do their job, today that number is more than one in
three.” 2 Though sometimes licenses are created to ensure the health and safety of
the general public, 3often they are only created to protect already established
businesses from facing new competition. The requirements one must meet to
obtain a license come in many forms: specialty degrees, several-year
apprenticeships, and even approval from one’s competitors in order to enter the
market. 4 Though not always this prevalent in America, these protectionist
occupational licensing schemes are now seen in many industries. In fact, these
laws are so disputed that the debate over their legality has led to a circuit split.
This comment begins by unveiling a brief history of occupational licensing
laws in the United States. It continues in Parts III and IV with an exploration and
discussion of two factually similar cases from the funeral industry. These cases
represent both sides of the circuit split. Part V analyzes how these cases, and
others like it, affect economic liberty; more importantly, this comment explains
* Lana Harfoush is a third year student at Pepperdine University School of Law. She was a Fulbright
Scholarship recipient and holds her B.A. from the University of Chicago. She would like to thank her
parents, Dennis and Cindy Sinnott, Brian Link and the Pacific Legal Foundation. She would also like to
thank Tim Sandefur and Clint Bolick for their contributions to the field of economic liberty as well as
personal guidance.
1
Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004).
2
Why Can’t Chuck Get His Business Off the Ground, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 02, 2011); see
also Stephanie Simon, A License to Shampoo: Jobs Needing State Approval Rise, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7,
2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703445904576118030935929752.
html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection. Simon writes:
The most recent study, from 2008, found 23% of U.S. workers were required to
obtain state licenses, up from just 5% in 1950, according to data from [an
economist]. In the mid-1980s, about 800 professions were licensed in at least one
state. Today, at least 1,100 are, according to the Council on Licensure,
Enforcement and Regulation, a trade group for regulatory bodies. Among the
professions licensed by one or more states: florists, interior designers, private
detectives, hearing-aid fitters, conveyor-belt operators and retailers of frozen
desserts.
Id.
3
Physicians are a common example of an occupational license created to promote the health and
safety of the general population.
4
See infra note 96.
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why it matters. Part VI looks at the rational basis test and the problems associated
with it. This is the test courts currently use to scrutinize regulations that interfere
with economic liberties. Part VII examines an even more recent funeral case now
set for appellate review, demonstrating the timeliness of this important issue that
will have a profound impact on the future of occupational licensing schemes
generally. Part VII also considers what the role of these laws will be in the years
to come. This comment concludes with Part VIII and the hope that an increasing
number of courts and legislatures will disassemble licensing regulations created for
protectionist purposes.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LAWS IN THE US
Economic liberty is “the right to pursue an honest living in a business or
profession free from arbitrary government interference.” 5 This right has been
promoted and protected throughout early American history. 6 The Founding
Fathers believed economic liberty was a natural right and that “the individual’s
right to go into business and keep the fruits of his labor” was “among the most
important liberties.” 7 Influential political economists, such as Adam Smith, argued
that governments should allow businesses to compete fairly without subsidies and
special favors because such economic environment was in the consumer’s

5
CLINT BOLICK, DAVID’S HAMMER THE CASE FOR AN ACTIVIST JUDICIARY 98 (Cato Institute
2007). Milton Friedman also described an “essential part of economic freedom” as the:
[F]reedom to use the resources we possess in accordance with our own values—
freedom to enter any occupation, engage in any business enterprise, buy from and
sell to anyone else, so long as we do so on a strictly voluntary basis and do not
resort to force in order to coerce others. Today you are not free to offer your
services as a lawyer, a physician, a dentist, a plumber, a barber, a mortician, or
engage in a host of other occupations, without first getting a permit or license
from a government official.
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 66 (Harcourt
1979).
6
See TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING: ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW 23–
25 (Cato Institute 2010). Regarding occupational licensing schemes in English common law, guilds
would “use[] their licensing power to create artificial scarcity” in order to protect their jobs and keep
prices higher than a free market would allow. Id. at 23. But often, English courts and prominent
members of Parliament would speak out in defense of the right to earn a living. See id. at 18–24. One
argument by Lord Coke, claimed that licensing was unnecessary in a marketplace involving many
occupations where legal redress and damages could be sought for injury. Id. at 23. Lord Coke further
explained that the “possibility that a practitioner might do a bad job was not a good excuse for
restricting economic freedom, raising costs to consumers, and depriving entrepreneurs of economic
opportunity.” Id. English courts believed that the right to earn a living was one of “nationalistic
concern for increasing the wealth of the realm.” Id. at 24. America’s Founders saw it “not as a matter
of privilege or of public policy[,] but instead as a matter of natural freedom.” Id.
7
See id. The Founders’ emphasis on this right is seen in numerous founding documents. This
includes the Declaration of Independence’s “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”—which was
altered from John Locke’s “life, liberty, and estate” and interpreted by many Constitutional scholars as
referring to the “individual’s right to pursue a trade and thereby improve his position in life.” Id. It
also includes George Mason’s Virginia Declaration of Rights “declaring that ‘all men are by nature
equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights,’ including ‘the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety.’” Id.
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interest. 8 Even charters granted by government authorities did not necessarily
encompass the right to be free from competition with other businesses. 9 At the
time of the country’s founding, “concern about the evils of state-granted
monopolies was so prevalent . . . that four states—Massachusetts, North Carolina,
New Hampshire, and New York— included prohibitions against monopolies in
their proposed bills of rights when ratifying the Constitution” and “many states
included such provisions in their own constitutions.” 10
Years later, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities clause
was created, which “was intended to protect, among other things, the traditional
right to earn a living free from unreasonable interference.” 11 This clause was
largely in response to the occupational licensing laws enacted after the Civil War
during Reconstruction; those licensing laws were meant to exclude freed slaves
from earning a living and owning property. 12 The principle author of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities clause, John Bingham,
explained that the clause was meant to protect in part “the liberty . . . to work in an
honest calling and contribute by your toil in some sort to the support of yourself, to
the support of your fellowmen, and to be secure in the enjoyment of the fruits of
your toil.” 13
This active protection of economic liberties was greatly damaged at the turn
of the century due to an influx of cheap labor from mass immigration to the United
States; politicians began to enact legislation that “promote[d] the self-interested
economic agenda of the politically powerful establishment at the expense of the
politically disenfranchised, including Irish immigrants, European Jews, Catholics,
Asians, African-Americans, and as increasing numbers of them began leaving the
home and entering the workforce, women.” 14 Conceptually, the idea is simple: at

8
See id. at 25. Sandefur emphasizes one of Smith’s most famous quotes on this topic:
“[c]onsumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer ought to
be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer.” Id. In order to
encourage wealth, governments needed to encourage competition and the quality products that resulted
from a marketplace untainted by a crony capitalist society. Id.
9
See id. at 30 (quoting Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837)).
10
Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY
898, 901 (2005).
11
See SANDEFUR, supra note 6, at 40.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 41. Another representative at that time remarked:
[H]as no every person a right, to carry on his own occupation, to secure the fruits
of his own industry, and appropriate them as best suits himself, as long as it is a
legitimate exercise of this right and not vicious in itself, or against public policy,
or morally wrong, or against the natural rights of others?
Id. More modernly, Clint Bolick explained that when it comes to the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Privileges or Immunities clause, “any believer in original intent who devotes even the most cursory
attention to the legislative history and to the problem Congress sought to correct will conclude that
Congress unambiguously meant to protect economic liberty against excessive state regulation.”
BOLICK, supra note 5, at 100.
14
See Neily, supra note 10, at 901. Politicians would mask discriminatory legislation under the
guise of protecting health and safety. Id. at 901–02. This was seen everywhere from, New York, where
it was illegal to roll cigars in tenement houses (where immigrants lived), to many California cities,
where “forbidding the operation of wooden laundries were supposedly enacted to reduce the risk of
fire.” Id. at 902. But actually, the effect “ victimize[d] Chinese immigrants who, as it so happened,
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that time businesses and workers worried that they would lose an advantage in the
marketplace when new, cheaper labor arrived. Though “licensing laws, which
limit[ed] economic opportunity, were originally allowed insofar as they protected
the public health and safety,” unfortunately, “as economists predicted, [those laws]
bec[a]me perverted into a tool for obstructing competition.” 15
Courts at the turn of the century did not strike down every example of
occupational licensing schemes but instead, “judges struggled mightily to balance
the legitimate interests of government in serving genuine public purposes with the
widespread and historically indisputable tendency of politicians to shamelessly sell
their occupational licensing power to the highest-bidding special interests.” 16 But
amid the balancing tests, the Court never questioned the existence of the right to
earn a living, and there has “never been any doubt at the Supreme Court about
whether the Constitution protects the right of citizens to earn a living in the
occupation of their choice.” 17
Arguably the biggest blow to economic liberty was the Slaughter-House
Cases, 18 in which the Supreme Court’s five to four decision “effectively
eliminated the [privileges or immunities] clause as a meaningful constitutional
protection and ensured that, except where other constitutional provisions applied,
states would have the power to create monopolies and violate the economic
freedom of entrepreneurs without being limited by federal courts.” 19 Many

tended to own wooden laundries while white-owned laundries were generally made of brick or stone.”
Id.
15
Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion A Legitimate State Interest? Four Recent Cases Test
the Boundaries, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1023, 1028 (2006).
16
See Neily, supra note 10, at 902.
17
Id. at 904.
18
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). As Timothy Sandefur describes this case:
[B]egan in 1869 when the owners of the Crescent City Livestock Landing and
Slaughtering Company bribed the Louisiana legislature into passing a law that
required all butchers in the New Orleans area to do their butchering at a single
slaughterhouse—one owned, of course, by the Crescent City Company. That
meant ruin for dozens if not hundreds of small, private butcher shops, which
would now be required to slaughter their livestock at the Crescent City abattoir.
Those butchers filed lawsuits, arguing that the new requirement deprived them of
their common-law right to earn a living—a right that was among the ‘privileges
or immunities’ of citizenship, which the state could not abridge. The state argued
that the law was intended simply to protect the public health and safety, noting
that many butcher shops were unsanitary affairs. Requiring that butchering be
done at a single location would protect the public from the threat of disease. But
this theory had one obvious flaw: if the law had been intended as a sanitary
measure, why had it not regulated the conditions of those butcher shops? Instead,
the law merely granted an exclusive economic privilege to a single private
company.
SANDEFUR, supra note 6, at 41–42.
19
Id. at 41–43. This was an abhorrent decision to Justice Stephen J. Field who believed the:
[A]mendment was intended to incorporate, among other things, the common-law
right to earn a living – what he called ‘the distinguish privilege of citizens of the
United States. To them, everywhere, all pursuits, all professions, all avocations
are open without other restrictions than such as are imposed equally upon all
others of the same age, sex, and condition.’
Id. at 43.
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advocates of economic freedom argue that the Court “should have recognized that
the rights guaranteed by the privileges or immunities clause protect all citizens
against state governments.” 20 At least one scholar has described this case as the
time when the Court “simply threw in the towel and declared the federal judiciary
to be out of the business of subjecting economic regulations to any meaningful
level of scrutiny.” 21
Though the Commerce Clause and the Privileges or Immunities clause were
meant to “protect citizens against interstate trade barriers,” since Slaughter-House
the Fourteenth Amendment “is not sufficiently specific to curtail overly
protectionist trade barriers within a state.” 22 Later, Jim Crow era protectionist
occupational laws were designed to keep African-Americans from earning an
honest living. Sadly, those who sought to contest those laws as unconstitutional
“were deprived by Slaughter-House of their strongest argument, freedom of
contract.” 23 Today, some argue that economic liberty is not a fundamental civil
right at all, but even the court in Slaughter-House agreed unanimously that it is. 24
There, the Court “did not disagree that [economic liberty] is a fundamental right,”
but rather whether “that right was protected against abridgement by the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 25 Though Slaughter-House is infamous for
damaging the right to earn a living, several other cases since then have been
notably destructive to economic freedom as well. 26
20
See CLINT BOLICK, DEATH GRIP: LOOSENING THE LAW’S STRANGLEHOLD OVER ECONOMIC
LIBERTY 22 (Hoover Institution Press 2011) [hereinafter DEATH GRIP].
21
See Neily, supra note 10, at 903.
22
See BOLICK, supra note 5, at 109.
23
Id. at 101. Instead, the plaintiffs were left to challenge the laws on equal protection grounds. Id.
Some of those protectionist laws survive today or until relatively recently. Id. One example was the
story of Ego Brown whose shoeshine business was shutdown in Washington D.C. because of an old law
that “forbade ‘bootblacks’” from shining shoes on the street. Id. at 104. Fortunately, this was struck
down as a “violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment” and it even failed the rational
basis test for not being “both conceivable and rational.” Id. at 105 (quoting Brown v. Barry, 710 F.
Supp. 352, 355 (D.D.C. 1989)). Clark Neily points out another example of how restrictive state
licensing schemes negatively affected blacks in America:
[S]o-called “emigrant agents,” who traveled around the South encouraging newly
freed African-Americans to move west to work at understaffed cotton plantations
in Mississippi and Texas, were subjected to exorbitant “registration fees” and
occupational taxes--not to thwart the emigration of cheap labor, of course, but
simply to ensure proper oversight and regulation of their activities. More blatant
was the enactment of “Black Codes,” many of which contained ostensibly raceneutral provisions such as curfew laws that were, in application, clearly designed
to prevent African-Americans from exercising their hard-won economic liberties.
Neily, supra note 10, at 902. See also DEATH GRIP, supra note 20, at 32–33.
24
Id. at 43.
25
Id. at 35.
26
See id. at 9–11. One of these cases includes a 1955 case in which “the court sustained a statute
prohibiting opticians from duplicating old or broken eyeglass lenses, or form fitting old lenses into new
frames, without a prescription from a licensed optometrist.” Id. Another case that damaged liberty took
place in 1976, in which the Supreme Court upheld a law that prohibited hot dog pushcarts in New
Orleans—except for two carts that were “grandfathered” in. Id. In a 1993 case, the Supreme Court set
forth “extreme deference to administrative discretion in a set of rules implementing the rational basis
standard.” Id. This deference became an example of “judicial abdication” where courts would
“blindingly defer to legislative decision-making.” Id. In all three cases, the court deferred to the
legislature instead of enforcing workers’ economic rights. Id.
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Since Slaughter-House, at best, governments have used their power to
regulate when it was absolutely necessary to protect the health and safety of the
general welfare; at worst, they have used their power to “insulate one business
from competition by others.” 27 This is an attractive plan for many businesses that
have a lot to gain from government protection. Protected companies may “invest a
great deal of time and money in efforts to influence [government] power in their
favor” because they profit by keeping other companies out of the marketplace—all
without the “burden” of competing fairly with better quality or more cost efficient
Protected companies can effectively use the government to
products. 28
“illegaliz[e] their competition.” 29 Sometimes state regulatory boards even enact
grandfather clauses which “exempt[] existing works from the testing
requirements.” 30 This process hurts new and rising entrepreneurs, who simply
want to start their businesses without unreasonable interference, and consumers,
who want to buy quality goods at low prices.
III. CRAIGMILES V. GILES: PROTECTIONIST LICENSING REGULATIONS FAIL
The funeral industry often provides examples of such protected companies.
In the 2002 Craigmiles v. Giles case, the Sixth Circuit decided the requirement that
one must be a licensed funeral director simply to sell caskets was “designed only
for the economic protection of funeral home operators” and “not even rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.” 31
In Craigmiles, proprietors of two independent casket stores challenged a
provision of the Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act (FDEA) that
“forbid[] anyone from selling caskets without being licensed by the state as a
‘funeral director.’” 32 Rev. Nathaniel Craigmiles was one of those proprietors; he
went into the business because he was “incensed over the exorbitant prices his
congregants were forced to pay by funeral homes for caskets.” 33 The process by
which those interested in the profession became funeral directors in Tennessee,
required that they undergo “two years of education and training,” very little of
which “pertain[ed] to casket design or selection.” 34 For this reason, the owners of
the casket stores argued that the FDEA violated “both the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 35
The history of the Tennessee FDEA began in 1951 when the funeral
licensing legislation was originally enacted. 36 At that time, the definition of
“funeral directing” was “limited to the arranging of funeral ceremonies, burial,

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

See SANDEFUR, supra note 6, at 141.
Id.
Id.
Simon, supra note 2.
Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 222.
See BOLICK, supra note 5, at 106.
See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222.
Id.
Id.
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cremation, and embalming” and did not include the sale of caskets. 37 This
changed in 1972 when the definition was expanded by the Tennessee General
Assembly to include the “making of arrangements to provide for funeral services
and/or the selling of funeral merchandise, and/or the making of financial
arrangements for the rendering of the services, and/or the sale of such
merchandise.” 38
This change forced entrepreneurs, who were exclusively trying to sell
caskets and funeral merchandise at competitive rates, to undergo rigorous and
irrelevant training. The course schedule of the training required that applicants
“complete[d] either one year of course work at an accredited mortuary school and
then a one-year apprenticeship with a licensed funeral director or a two-year
apprenticeship,” followed by taking and passing the state’s Funeral Arts
Examination. 39 At the only school in Tennessee that offered the required
coursework, Gupton College, students testified that “casket and urn issues
constituted no more than five percent of the Gupton curriculum.” 40
The plaintiffs in this case operated stores that sold caskets, urns, grave
markers, monuments, flower holders, and other similar merchandise items. 41
Though the plaintiffs did not engage in “embalming or arranging of funeral
services, cremations, or burials,” the Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers
issued a cease and desist order to prevent the plaintiffs from selling funeral
merchandise including caskets. 42 The Board said Craigmiles and the other
plaintiffs in the case were violating the FDEA for operating without a licensed
funeral director. 43 “Reverend Craigmiles sold the exact same caskets as the funeral
homes”; the only difference was, he sold them “at a much lower price.” 44
Statutes regulating fundamental rights are subject to a heightened standard of
review referred to as strict scrutiny, where “the regulation must serve a compelling
state purpose and be narrowly tailored to achieving that purpose.” 45 Other rights
are subject to rational basis review, where there is a “strong presumption of
validity,” requiring only that “there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts
that could provide a rational basis.” 46
The Sixth Circuit noted that “even foolish and misdirected provisions are
generally valid if subject only to rational basis review.” 47 Moreover, those seeking

37

Id.
Id. “This specific action of requiring licensure . . . appears directed at protecting licensed
funeral directors from retail price competition.” Id. at 227. Writing for the Sixth Circuit, Judge Boggs
noted the obvious protectionist motives of the altered definition: “Tennessee’s justifications for the
1972 amendment come close to striking us with ‘the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead
fish.’” Id. at 222. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-101(a)(3)(A)(ii) (2011).
39
Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222.
40
Id.
41
See id. at 223.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
See BOLICK, supra note 5, at 108.
45
See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 223.
46
Id. at 224.
47
Id. at 223–24.
38
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to invalidate a statute using rational basis review are faced with the daunting task
of “negativ[ing] every conceivable basis that might support it.” 48 In spite of the
very low bar a regulation must pass to be upheld under the rational basis test, the
court found the licensing requirement was only to protect already operating funeral
homes from competition, which the Sixth Circuit believed was not a valid state
interest. It cited cases proving that courts have “repeatedly recognized that
protecting a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate
governmental purpose.” 49 The Sixth Circuit explained that keeping unlicensed
casket retailers out of the market resulted in higher prices for consumers because
“funeral home operators sell caskets at prices substantially over total costs” and
benefit from minimal competition. 50
Though the Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers argued that the
occupational license requirement was essential to promote health, safety, and
consumer protection, the Sixth Circuit disagreed. The Board claimed that the
license requirement “insure[d] that those who handle[d] dead bodies may dispose
of them safely and prevent the spread of communicable diseases.” 51 However,
Craigmiles and his fellow plaintiffs neither handled dead bodies nor engaged in the
embalming process; they were simply trying to earn a living by selling caskets and
funeral merchandise to eager customers. 52 In nearly every case, the plaintiffs
simply “deliver[ed] the purchased casket to the funeral home.” 53 Though a leaking
casket could pose health and safety risks by contaminating the groundwater with
bacteria, caskets themselves are not regulated by Tennessee law. 54 In fact,
Tennessee “does not require that any particular type of casket, or any casket at all,
be used at burial.” 55 Caskets sold by licensed funeral directors were in no way
“systematically more protective than those sold by independent casket retailers”;
instead, they were simply “systematically more expensive.” 56
The Sixth Circuit explained how the market would lead to safer, better
quality caskets than the protectionist regulation ever could. Generally speaking,
more protective caskets were more expensive, but “nothing prevent[ed] licensed
funeral directors from selling shoddy caskets at high prices.” 57 Increased
competition would result in more affordable prices, bringing down even the price

48

Id. at 224.
Id.; see City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (“Thus, where simple economic
protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.”).
50
See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224. The Sixth Circuit noted that the district court found that
“funeral home operators generally mark up the price of caskets 250 to 600 percent [sic], whereas casket
retailers sell caskets at much smaller margins.” Id.
51
Id. at 225.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. Judge Boggs notes, “[i]t is perfectly legal in Tennessee for loved-ones to provide a
homemade casket, for friends to give (but not to sell) a casket for use in burial, or for a body to be
buried in no container at all. This lack of regulation of body disposal is no different for those who have
died from contagious diseases.” Id.
56
Id. at 225–26.
57
Id. at 226.
49
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of the highest quality caskets, enabling more people to purchase them. 58 The court
found that there was no rational relation between the licensing requirement and
public safety or consumer protection. 59 Many of the misrepresentations and much
of the fraud that the Board claimed it was trying to prevent via the licensing
scheme were “generally applicable to retailers already, enforced by civil and
criminal sanctions.” 60 Judge Boggs correctly explained, “the legislature could
have directly required casket retailers to comply with [particular standards] without
imposing the licensure requirements.” 61
The Sixth Circuit found the Board’s protectionist licensing regulation
“illegitimate” and a “significant barrier to competition in the casket market”;
ultimately the regulation “harm[ed] consumers in their pocketbooks” and did not
survive even under the overwhelmingly deferential standards of the rational basis
test. 62 Under this analysis, licensing schemes that only provide benefits to already
existing businesses with political clout (and hurt consumers in the process) are not
valid regulations. In essence, these regulations are state sanctioned cartels, which
impose barriers to entry and keep prices artificially high. The Sixth Circuit’s
decision is respectful of both entrepreneurs’ and consumers’ economic liberty. It
acknowledges that repercussions for fraud and the promotion of consumer
protection already exist outside of restrictive licensing schemes.
But,
unfortunately, this well-reasoned legal analysis has not been adopted nationwide.
IV. POWERS V. HARRIS, PROTECTIONIST LICENSING LAWS PREVAIL
Six days after Craigmiles was decided, an Oklahoma district court, having
heard a factually similar case, arrived at a vastly different result, only to be
affirmed by the Tenth Circuit two years later. That Oklahoma case was Powers v.
Harris, 63 the leading case opposed to the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Craigmiles.
Thus, a circuit split was created that carries broad and dangerous implications for
economic liberty.
Similar to the Craigmiles case, Powers involved a statute that sought to limit
the sale of funeral-service merchandise, 64 including caskets. Anyone interested in
58

Id.
Id. Judge Boggs noted that, “[e]ven if casket selection has an effect on public health and safety,
restricting the retailing of caskets to licensed funeral directors bears no rational relationship to
managing that effect.” Id. The state also argued that during training, licensed funeral directors receive
psychological training to help them better interact with grieving clientele, to which the court responded:
“[S]urvivors must deal with a panoply of vendors in order to make funeral arrangements, from churches
to food vendors for a wake, none of whom is required to have this psychological training. This
justification is very weak, indeed.” Id. at 228.
60
Id. at 226.
61
Id. at 228.
62
Id. Judge Bogg wrote, “we invalidate only the General Assembly’s naked attempt to raise a
fortress protecting the monopoly rents that funeral directors extract from consumers. This measure to
privilege certain businessmen over others at the expense of consumers is not animated by a legitimate
governmental purpose and cannot survive even rational basis review.” Id. at 229.
63
Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004).
64
In Oklahoma the definition of funeral service merchandise was expanded to “include[e], but not
[be] limited to, the sale of burial supplies and equipment, but excluding the sale by a cemetery of lands
or interests therein, services incidental thereto, markers, memorials, monuments, equipment, crypts,
59
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selling these products is forced by statute to “be a licensed funeral director
operating out of a funeral establishment.” 65 The Oklahoma statute detailing this
requirement is called the Oklahoma Funeral Services Licensing Act (FSLA). 66
Curiously, the FSLA does not extend its licensing requirement to retailers who
“sell other funeral-related merchandise (e.g., urns, grave markers, monuments,
clothing, and flowers).” 67 Another difference between the Oklahoma and
Tennessee statutes, was that in Oklahoma, the casket-selling regulation
distinguished time of need sales from pre-paid sales; this permitted salespeople to
sell caskets “pre-paid without a license so long as that person is acting as an agent
of a licensed funeral director.” 68 The FSLA also only applied intrastate, meaning
an unlicensed person could sell a casket out of state, but not within the state, if the
casket was a time of need sale and not paid for in advance. 69
Like the Tennessee regulation, in order to obtain a funeral director’s license
in Oklahoma, one had to go through rigorous, expensive, and time-consuming
training. 70 Applicants for funeral director’s licenses were required to “complete
both sixty credit hours of specified undergraduate training and a one-year
apprenticeship.” 71 During the apprenticeship applicants needed to “embalm
twenty-five bodies.” 72 In addition to these requirements, applicants also had to
“pass both a subject-matter and an Oklahoma law exam.” 73 The district court
noted in this case that “less than five percent of the education and training
requirements necessary for licensure in Oklahoma pertain[ed] directly to any
knowledge or skills necessary to sell caskets.” 74 Oddly, the Oklahoma State Board
of Embalmers and Funeral Directors had deemed its excessive training regimen
and state examination insufficient to sell a casket in-state at the time of someone’s
death. Thus, the Oklahoma State Board required sellers of funeral merchandise to
operate out of a funeral establishment. This means anyone hoping to sell caskets at
the time of need must “have [had] a fixed physical location, a preparation room
that meets the requirements for embalming bodies, a funeral-service merchandiseselection room with an inventory of not less than five caskets, and adequate areas
for public viewing of human remains.” 75
Kim Powers and Dennis Bridges owned an online store called Memorial
Concepts Online, Inc., through which they sold funeral merchandise. Their
business “offered no other death- or funeral-related services, plays no role in the
niches or outer enclosures.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 396.2 (West 2010).
65
Powers, 379 F.3d at 1211.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1212.
70
Id.
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Id.
72
Id.
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Id.
74
Id. at 1213–14. The district court commented on the inefficiency and absurd demand where
funeral merchandise retailers were “required to spend years of their lives equipping themselves with
knowledge and training which is not directly relevant to selling caskets.” Id. at 1214.
75
Id. at 1212–13.
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disposition of human remains, and is not licensed in Oklahoma as a funeral
establishment.” 76 Neither Powers nor Bridges had the requisite license to sell
caskets; plus, because they sold their merchandise online, the business lacked the
“fixed physical location” mentioned above. But those two were not strangers to
the funeral business. Powers actually had “many years of experience selling
caskets on a pre-need basis as the agent of a licensed Oklahoma funeral director,”
and Bridges was licensed in Tennessee for over twenty years; objectively, the two
plaintiffs were overqualified to sell caskets, which at their basic level, are simply
boxes. 77
The district court opined in its decision that this licensing scheme showed
“intent to forego laissez faire treatment of those sales and services when provided
in [Oklahoma].” 78 The plaintiffs in this case wanted to sell caskets in-state to
consumers at the time of their loved ones’ deaths, but feared legal action if they
were to provide that service. The plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action,
asserting that the FSLA violated the Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and
Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 79
The Board argued that the licensing regulation was necessary to protect
casket purchasers because of the great potential for emotional and psychological
pain, making them “a particularly vulnerable group.” 80 Like the Craigmiles case,
the level of scrutiny for this licensing regulation was the rational basis test. Even
though the Board admitted that its licensing scheme did “not perfectly match its
asserted consumer-protection goal,” the Board also argued that it was close enough
to be upheld; unfortunately the Tenth Circuit agreed. 81 The circuit court explained
that it must “consider every plausible legitimate state interest that might support
the FSLA”—even at the expense of the right to earn a living and economic
freedom. 82
As in Craigmiles, the court spoke of the deferential nature of the rational
basis test. Citing a 1938 Supreme Court case, 83 it argued that when legislative
judgment is challenged on the basis of equal protection and the “issue is debatable,
the decision of the legislature must be upheld if ‘any state of facts either known or
which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it.’” 84 The Tenth Circuit
opined that questioning the legislature’s regulations or suggesting alternative
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Id. at 1213.
Id.
78
Id. The district court also noted, “very little specialized knowledge is required to sell caskets.
Most consumers select caskets based on price and style. Any information a generally educated person
needs to know about caskets in order to sell them can be acquired on the job.” Id.
79
Id. at 1214.
80
Id. at 1215.
81
Id. at 1216. The Board claimed its regulation was “not ‘wholly irrelevant’ because ‘[e]very
witness who testified on the subject agreed that consumers purchasing time-of-need caskets may be
especially vulnerable to overreaching sales tactics because of grief and other emotions which arise as
the result of the death of the person for whom the consumer is purchasing a casket.’” Id.
82
Id. at 1218.
83
See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
84
Powers, 379 F.3d at 1216–17.
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solutions were not permitted under a rational basis test analysis. 85 It looked to
cases explaining that rational basis review upholds laws even though they “may
not succeed in bringing about the result it seeks to accomplish” or because “no
empirical evidence supports the assumptions underlying the legislative choice.” 86
The bar for upholding laws under this test was and still is incredibly low; in many
circumstances the rational basis test requires that the party unlucky enough to
challenge the regulation must “negative every conceivable basis which might
support it.” 87
The Tenth Circuit explained that when scrutinizing regulations there is a
strong presumption of validity. This presumption is so strong that it kills virtually
all arguments of even illegitimate intended purposes, such as protectionism. This
reasoning begs the question: why then, do courts not automatically dismiss every
challenge to a regulatory scheme? The Tenth Circuit defended its decision by
listing a parade of horribles that might occur if courts decided to intervene when
legislatures behaved badly. It wanted to avoid “paralyz[ing] state governments . . .
constantly asking them to ‘try again’” or “substituting [its] view of the public good
or the general welfare for that chosen by the states” when the “definition of public
good changes with the political winds.” 88 But the Tenth Circuit ignored the fact
that established businesses lobby politicians to shut competition out; those fickle
political winds the court alluded to will leave honest businesspeople— people
trying to fairly provide goods and services to the public —out of luck. The right to
earn a living is just that: a right. Like other rights, courts must protect it. 89
In spite of the Tenth Circuit’s reluctance to interfere with legislative intent,
its opinion seemed focused on the “wide-ranging” externalities that its decision
would have on policy: the circuit court worried that if they had overturned the
statute, “every piece of legislation in six states aiming to protect or favor one
industry or business over another in the hopes of luring jobs to that state would be
in danger.” 90 In other words, the circuit court would be responsible for protecting
the entrepreneur’s right to earn a living and harming blatant occupational
protectionism not just in the case at hand, but in the several states that constitute
the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit also opined that the plaintiffs “must turn to
the Oklahoma electorate” to abolish such regulations; but when pre-existing
businesses support politicians in order to construct large barriers to entry in their
occupations, it is for the courts, not the electorate, to protect minority rights. 91
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Id. at 1217.
Id. See Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 50 (1966); see also Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 110–11 (1979).
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Powers, 379 F.3d at 1217 (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)).
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Id. at 1218.
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Amici in this case advocated for the plaintiffs and others like them, urging the Tenth Circuit to
see that economic protectionism was not a legitimate state interest to be supported by licensing schemes
or otherwise. Amicus curiae briefs were filed by: John Eastman, The Claremont Institute Center for
Constitutional Jurisprudence, Orange, CA; Deborah J. La Fetra and Timothy Sandefur, Pacific Legal
Foundation, Sacramento, CA in conjunction with Mark K. Moller, Cato Institute, Washington D.C. Id.
at 1211.
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V. HOW THESE CASES AFFECT ECONOMIC LIBERTY AND WHY IT MATTERS
The funeral industry affects all of us at some point or another. Funerals are
commonly the third highest cost a family ever accrues—usually behind a family’s
home and car. 92 Nationally, between 22,000 and 23,000 funeral establishments
make arrangements for “approximately two million people each year.” 93 In 2007,
the average cost of a funeral was $7,323; caskets often account for one-third to
one-half of that cost. 94
Although licensing restrictions in the funeral industry affect most Americans
as consumers, the scope of this circuit split reaches far beyond that, into nearly
every existing industry. When businesses lobby governments to enact legislation,
they establish large, often insurmountable barriers to competition. Unsurprisingly,
many different kinds of businesses want to benefit from government favors—and
legislatures are often happy to oblige. The benefits of licensing are “heavily
concentrated in current practitioners and the liabilities are dispersed among
potential new practitioners and consumers,” and those “currently licensed have a
much stronger incentive to lobby for licensing restrictions than potential
practitioners and consumers have to lobby against them.” 95
Several non-profit, public interest law firms and think tanks specialize in
cases where the right to earn a living is threatened and advocate for entrepreneurs.
The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) and the Institute for Justice (IJ) are two of
those public interest law firms. Both firms have unearthed many industries where
protectionist occupational licensing requirements are the norm.
For example, Missouri is one of many states that has enacted restrictions for
people in the moving industry. 96 In one of PLF’s current cases, a man who has
been operating his moving company in St. Louis, Missouri for over twenty years
was notified that he needed a special license called a certificate of necessity to stay
in business. 97 The statute at issue in that case states: “the Department of
Transportation shall notify existing moving companies, and permit them to
intervene in the application process and object to a new application on the basis
that a new company is ‘inconsistent with the public convenience and necessity.’” 98
In other words, this man who has been in business for two decades, with an
Angie’s List quality rating, 99 is forced by law to ask his competitors whether or not
he is allowed to operate. 100 Naturally, several existing companies objected to his
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Complaint at 4, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 2010 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings 2717 (E.D. La. Aug.
12, 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-02717).
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Anthony B. Sanders, Exhumation Through Burial: How Challenging Casket Regulations Helped
Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 MINN. L. REV. 668, 694 (2004).
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Anticompetition laws collide with the Constitution: Munie v. Skouby, PAC. LEGAL FOUND.
http://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=1224 (last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
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Id.
98
Id.
99
ABC QUALITY MOVERS, http://www.abcqualitymovers.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
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application. 101 These certificate of necessity laws are arguably worse than the
occupational licensing restrictions at issue in the funeral cases, because “they exist
for the explicit purpose of stifling competition and protecting established
businesses against newcomers,” and do not even pretend to appeal to arguments of
health and safety. 102 PLF argues that the Missouri scheme was created “not to
protect public health and safety but to protect established businesses against
competition by [new] entrepreneurs” and, therefore, the statute “violates the Due
Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” 103
To put it another way, just imagine what would happen if a new fast food
chain had to prove to McDonald’s and Burger King that another hamburger joint
was necessary in a particular community; or if a new purse manufacturer had to
ask Coach and Kate Spade for permission to make handbags. These businesses
have an interest in making a profit and keeping their market shares if at all
possible. If these schemes are constructed in a way that gives competitors the last
word on newcomers entering a market, then those new businesses will rarely, if
ever, be allowed to operate. It is just as easy as saying: no, new entrepreneur, your
business isn’t necessary because we’re already here.
It is consumers who should decide what is necessary in the marketplace, not
by lobbying the government for special favors, but instead by making choices with
their individual purchasing power. Consumers are best situated to decide what
products and services best suit them as individuals. Charles Wheelan, a lecturer of
public policy and University of Chicago professor, sums it up well: “It’s fairly easy
for you to tell whether you’ve gotten a bad haircut or not, and if quality turns out to
be bad, it’s not a big social problem.” 104 The lasting impact of “bad” products is
often miniscule, if present at all—it’s not something the legislature needs to
control. Businesses and entrepreneurs are forced to take responsibility for bad
products because inferior quality loses customers.
There is little evidence to support the assertion that licensing requirements
ensure quality goods and services. In Alabama, which has the “strictest licensing
requirements” for manicurists, it is mandatory that would-be manicurists complete
“750 hours of schooling and a written and practical exam.” 105 According to the
Alabama Board of Cosmetology, there is an average of “four public complaints a
year” regarding Alabaman manicurists’ poor service. 106 Connecticut, on the other
hand, takes a different approach and doesn’t require manicurists to have a license
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at all. 107 Does this make a difference in number of annual complaints? Surely
they must surge! To the chagrin of licensing boards, that is not the case. There is
an average of only “six complaints a year to the state [of Connecticut] over the past
five years” regarding manicurists there; of those six, four are usually about gift
certificates that are not honored. 108 It is doubtful that Alabama includes a special
“gift certificate course” in its mandatory curriculum.
Not moving or getting a manicure anytime soon? Imagine instead, that you
want someone to fix a broken computer. In the state of Texas, computer repairmen
must be licensed. This means they are “required to have a degree in criminal
justice or perform a three-year apprenticeship under a licensed private
investigator” simply to fix computers. 109 That is devastating news for computer
savvy college students trying to earn a little cash. It is also frustrating news for
consumers who want to hire technicians. This law increases costs to enter the
profession, which increases costs for services and limits the number of technicians.
How many people with the knowledge and skills to fix computers are going to
spend three years learning how to become private investigators or earn degrees that
have nothing to do with instructional computer repair? IJ has brought this case and
it has yet to be decided.
Returning to this Comment’s opening question, how much training would
you require someone to have in order to sell you flowers? Let’s say you were
interested in buying flowers in Louisiana a couple of years ago. Only last year in
2010 was the Louisiana florists licensing scheme lifted by the legislature—thanks
to negative press and the pressure of an upcoming IJ lawsuit. 110 Before it was
lifted, a test was administered that applicants needed to pass in order to sell floral
arrangements. Each year the state would “arbitrarily fail[] numerous test takers”
in order to control the number of florists within Louisiana—though the regulation
was enacted under the guise of health and safety. 111 Today, there is still a required
test but it is much more simple and would not lead to the arbitrary exclusion of
florists trying to enter the market.
The lead attorney in the florist case, Tim Keller, remarked, “I can’t conceive
of an occupation less in need of government regulation than floral arranging.” 112
IJ’s argument was similar to other legal arguments made against protectionist
occupational licensing laws. Keller explained, “there is no reason to license
florists because there is no risk to anyone from buying flower arrangements from
unlicensed florists.” 113 As in the Louisiana florist case, sometimes legislatures are
persuaded to lift their protectionist bans because of public outcry. 114
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As discussed throughout this comment, occupational licensing laws are often
abused by legislatures in conjunction with pre-existing businesses to protect the
market shares they already possess. When businesses can control who enters the
market, they can reward themselves by keeping prices higher than the market
would allow if others were allowed to compete. Morris Kleiner, a labor professor
at the University of Minnesota, “looked at census data covering several
occupations that are regulated in some states but not others, including librarians,
nutritionists and respiratory therapists.” 115 Kleiner found that “employment
growth in those professions was about 20% greater, on average, in the unregulated
states between 1990 and 2000.” 116 He found in another study, that “licensed
workers earn, on average, 15% more than their unlicensed counterparts in other
states—a premium that may be reflected in their prices.” 117 He also estimated that
licensing laws added “at least $116 billion a year to the cost of services” in the
United States—which is “about 1% of total consumer spending.” 118
In a February 2011 Wall Street Journal article, a short list was compiled of
jobs that are subject to occupational licensing regulations in at least one or more
states. 119 The list was comprised of four major categories: Personal Care, Flora
and Fauna, Product and Home Care, and Other. 120 Jobs listed included: wig
specialists, shampoo specialists, naturopathic doctors, hearing aid dispensers,
athletic trainers, nuisance control specialists, wildlife rehabilitators, dog handlers,
land surveyors, appliance repair technicians, windshield installers, bedding supply
dealers, computer repair technicians, handymen, locksmiths, automotive parts
recyclers, private detectives, shorthand reporters, vending machine operators,
student athlete agents, professional wrestlers, and tour guides. 121 The Wall Street
Journal’s list is far from exhaustive. In the business climate of today, all industries
are fair game to the legislatures and regulatory boards eager to impose licensing
restrictions upon them.
VI. MORE ON THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY
As for the rational basis test, and as the opinions in Powers and Craigmiles
make clear, there are many grounds for criticism with this notoriously low standard
of review. Often, courts are reluctant to overstep their bounds and interfere with
legislative intent; this was the primary reason that the Tenth Circuit in Powers
upheld the protectionist licensing scheme before it. 122 In these cases, courts often
suggest that individuals who believe their economic rights are being violated by
state occupational licensing schemes, should use the political process for
Kroger, PAC. LEGAL FOUND., http://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=620 (last visited Nov. 21,
2011).
115
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protection of their rights instead of the judicial system. 123 These courts fail to
acknowledge in their opinions that “economic regulations are generally not enacted
by legislatures at all but by administrative agencies not answerable to voters.” 124
If a given state regulatory board is trying to push budding start-up businesses out
of the marketplace, and is also untouchable by both the judiciary and political
process, that leaves very little in the way of redress for thousands of budding
entrepreneurs throughout the country.
Some advocates of economic liberty and the right to earn an honest living do
not inherently reject the rational basis test; rather, they call for an application
where the state “articulates[s] a legitimate police-power justification, such as
health or safety, and demonstrate[s] that the law actually is related in a rational
way to that objective.” 125 If a law survived this application, it would be upheld.
Thus, the right to earn a living would be slightly more secure because purely
protectionist occupational licensing schemes would not be upheld.
Other advocates are less accepting of the test. One IJ lawyer described the
test as a “sham” that is “shamelessly pro-Government” which he believes “perverts
our system of justice” in application. 126 Clark Neily explained that when the Court
established the test over 100 years ago, the Court created a “fictive standard of
review that enables judges to speak as if the right of occupational freedom still
exists, without actually having to act as though it does.” 127 Because the legislature
never really has to provide the rationale for its proposed regulation, “facts tend to
be relevant only insofar as they help support the challenged regulation” or
government lawyers “simply make them up” to support the presumption of having
a rational basis for the regulation. 128 Neily worries that this encourages witnesses
to lie on the stand about the extensiveness of training required to perform a given
occupation. 129 For example, in the Powers case, a government witness defending
the casket regulation claimed under oath that sellers of caskets should know “how
atomic particles interact with each other” and “how a virus reproduces itself.” 130
Additionally, the rational basis test requires judges to “assist the government in
defending challenged regulations by dreaming up possible justifications of their
own”—something that does not exist in American law outside of the rational basis
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standard. 131
Opponents of the rational basis standard note that judges’ presumptive
deference to enacted regulations, combined with their great contributions to the
government’s side of the argument, produce a variety of negative, unintended
consequences. Some argue that judges witness real fraud and corruption within the
political process and, because of the rational basis test, are expected to look the
other way. 132 This puts plaintiffs in very tough situations. Worse, when citizens
want to assert their basic right to earn a living, under the rational basis test they are
charged with the discouraging and virtually impossible task of “‘negativing’ every
conceivable justification that might be advanced in support of a law.” 133 So not
only are aggrieved plaintiffs worried about being unable to support their families
by doing honest work, but they must also worry about tackling every rationale for
a regulation; this is not just what is stated in the regulation, or what is stated in the
legislative records, but also whatever the judge may think of while on the bench.
This is an overwhelming, discouraging, and impossible task.
When it comes to combating the rational basis test, there is also the option of
elevating the right to earn a living to its rightful status of other “fundamental”
rights. This would subject regulations, which restrict the right to earn a living, to a
higher level of scrutiny. If the right to earn a living is afforded review under
intermediate or strict scrutiny, this would be unquestionably more protective of
economic liberty (though admittedly that is a tall order for the time being). Unless
something changes, there is no question that the “rational basis test problem” is a
massive hurdle that must be overcome when dealing with cases involving
protectionist occupational licensing regulations and economic liberty.
VII. A NEW FUNERAL CASE EMERGES AND WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS
It is difficult to predict what the next stop on the road of protectionist
licensing schemes will be. Some economic liberty advocates note with frustration
that when “government destroys a person’s livelihood or business, even for the
most nefarious of purposes, courts typically will stand idly by.” 134 But the court in
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Craigmiles and others like it, 135 put forward opinions that seem promising for the
future of economic liberty in the face of purely protectionist licensing laws.
Though “[t]he Supreme Court has not struck down a law on economic substantive
due process grounds since 1936,” the lower federal courts and state courts are
increasingly “overturn[ing] decisions made by state and local governments on the
grounds that they violate economic substantive due process.” 136
Recently, a new case has emerged and is receiving a lot of attention for
addressing these questions (and once again in the funeral industry). The case was
filed in 2010 by the IJ, on behalf of its client Saint Joseph Abbey of St. Benedict,
Louisiana; a group of monks. 137 Those Benedictine monks have lived and worked
in their Abbey for over one hundred years. 138 Originally, the monks had “farmed
and harvested timber on their land,” but in the 1990s their advisors told them to
find another way to support their Order. 139 The monks made caskets for decades
for their small abbey community and eventually began using the caskets to provide
income for their monastery as requests for their finely crafted products
increased. 140 In 2007, the abbey “invested roughly $100,000 in a woodshop to sell
the simple caskets it had always made for its own monks.” 141 Monks in other
states such as Indiana, Iowa, Illinois, and Minnesota have similar workshops in
which they make caskets to pay their respective monasteries’ bills. 142
Unfortunately for the Louisianan monks, when a local Catholic newspaper
publicized their casket-making business, the Louisiana State Board of Embalmers
and Funeral Directors “slapped the abbey with a cease-and-desist order.” 143
Generally, the facts are reminiscent of Craigmiles and Powers, where a
group of individuals are under attack for selling “funeral merchandise” without the
appropriate state issued license. The Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and
Funeral Directors, which is “dominated by industry members,” is enforcing a

135
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regulation that could jail the monks for up to 180 days. 144 According to the initial
subpoena that the monks received, “a party can be subject to fines between $500
and $2,500 for each casket illegally sold.” 145 What real harm do the monks’
handcrafted caskets cause? One funeral home director down the road from the
abbey complained that the monks were, “cutting into [his] profit.” 146 This is a
curious complaint considering that they only sold sixty caskets since 2007, in a
state that has around 40,000 deaths annually. 147 However, this perceived
economic harm seems to be enough for the State Board of Embalmers and Funeral
Directors to try and stop the monks from providing their high-quality goods to
consumers.
It is not uncommon for state regulatory boards to wedge themselves between
aggrieved parties and the legislature that grants businesses special favors. The
monks sought help from their local state legislature “who agreed in May 2008 to
introduce a bill amending the law to permit casket sales by non-licensed funeral
directors.” 148 The bill went to the House Commerce Committee and thereafter
“funeral-industry lobbyist opposed the bill” and “several funeral directors showed
up at the hearing to register their disapproval.” 149 In 2010, the state senate also
failed to pass legislation exempting the monks from the law due to pressure from
the funeral industry. 150
Because handcrafted caskets are covered by the state’s definition of funeral
merchandise, this order of monks would have to “abandon their calling for one full
year to apprentice at a licensed funeral home” and take an examination. 151 The
regulations require the “funeral-director exam to cover topics such as sociology,
psychology, funeral directing, funeral-service law, Louisiana laws and regulations,
and anything else the State Board deems relevant.” 152 Unfortunately, what the
State Board deems relevant is far from what common sense deems relevant. If one
wants to handcraft and sell caskets, one’s knowledge of the great majority of the
required curriculum is irrelevant. The regulation will also subject the monks to
“substantial ongoing continuing education requirements” with which state-licensed
funeral directors must comply. 153
Additionally, the monks would be forced to “convert their monastery into a
‘funeral establishment’ by, among other things, installing equipment for
embalming human remains.” 154 Not only is the conversion of the workshop into a
funeral establishment an expensive and time-consuming feat, it is also entirely
useless because the monks never handle or embalm human remains. The monks
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simply attempt to pay their bills and support their abbey by building and selling
wooden caskets to people who want to buy them. There is no coercion of any kind
involved, just a product from which the monks derive income to support
themselves—a product that some people choose to buy.
The regulation cannot be valid under the guise of health and safety, because
caskets are not regulated in Louisiana—there is no law stating that dead bodies
must be buried in caskets. 155 IJ’s complaint goes further by noting that a casket is
not necessary just in Louisiana, but is “not required for burial in any state in the
country.” 156 In fact, a person could simply be buried in the ground covered by a
blanket or nothing at all. 157 Some environmental groups even encourage using
cardboard or no caskets. 158 This occupational licensing law appears to be nothing
more than a protectionist scheme so that already licensed funeral directors can
keep “the lucrative funeral market to [themselves].” 159
Another interesting aspect of this case and others, is that Louisiana “does not
require most sellers of other nonperishable goods to obtain specialized licenses,”
such as for “clothing, computers, furniture, nonprescription medical supplies, or
kitchen supplies.” 160 The state also does not require “other retailers to obtain
licenses that are only tangentially related to the goods being sold, as it does for
caskets.” 161 To illustrate that point, IJ’s initial complaint on behalf of the monks,
noted that Louisiana “does not require shoe salesmen to obtain podiatry licenses,
or mattress salesmen to obtain chiropractic licenses.” 162
When Louisiana does require retail occupations to have a specialized state
license, there must be a “direct relationship between the good being sold and both
the training required for the license and concerns about public health and safety
with the underlying product.” 163 IJ’s complaint references the fact that “retail
pharmacies must have a licensed pharmacist to sell prescription medication.” 164
This is a clear and direct relationship between the service/product and the license
required to provide that service, as well as a clear link to public health and safety.
When it comes to the monks’ casket case and other protectionist occupational
licensure cases (ie. cases that are just created to help businesses that already exist
keep their market shares intact), most of those regulations lack a direct link to
health, safety, and the industry that the regulation intends to influence. 165
But as IJ’s website warns, if businesses with government assistance are
“willing to go after monks, then no one in America is safe from organized special
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interests and their allies in state legislatures.” 166 IJ and the monks have already
publicized this case in attempts to inform the public about the licensing law and
educate them about the basic right to earn a living. 167 Public opinion has played an
important role for these pubic interest law firms in the past. As explained above,
often these law firms can use public opinion to pressure legislatures to repeal anticompetitive legislation: it may help in this case. Some media sources have brought
similar purely protectionist licensing restrictions to light.
On July 21, 2011 the Eastern District Court of Louisiana struck the
Louisiana licensing scheme down for violating the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses of the Constitution. 168 The court stated clearly that there was
“no rational basis for the State of Louisiana to require persons who seek to enter
into the retailing of caskets to undergo the training and expense necessary to
comply with [the licensing scheme’s] rules.” 169 The court also noted that “there is
nothing in the licensing procedures that bestow[] any benefit to the public in the
context of retail caskets,” and that “the sole reason for these laws is the economic
protection of the funeral industry which reason the Court has previously found not
to be a valid government interest standing alone to provide a constitutionally valid
reason for these provisions.” 170 The court followed the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning
in Craigmiles, finding for the plaintiff monks, asserting that the defendants’
arguments were “hollow.” 171 The court’s analysis explained that the licensing
scheme promoted neither consumer protection nor public health and safety. 172 The
opinion noted that “the provisions simply protect a well-organized industry that
seeks to maintain a strict hold on [that] business.” 173 This district court decision
was great news for the monks and their business. However, their victory may be
short-lived. The State of Louisiana Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors
(not interested in losing their protectionist advantages so quickly) have already
filed an appeal. 174 This appeal will send the case to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which will hopefully affirm the district court’s decision.
A 2011 Wall Street Journal article noted that poor economic conditions have
moved some legislators to think twice before passing some new licensing
regulations; it stated that “the licensing push is meeting pockets of resistance,
including a move by some legislators to require a more rigorous cost-benefit
analysis before any new licensing laws are approved.” 175 The article also noted
that some people were considering a variety of negative consequences of large
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regulatory regimes that “spawn[] huge bureaucracies including rosters of
inspectors,” and because of many requirements’ “pricey educations,” they
“prohibit low-income workers from breaking in to entry-level trades.” 176 Some
note that the high rate of occupational regulation in the service industry is
particularly troubling because the service industry makes up “three-quarters of
gross domestic product and most job growth in the U.S.,” and the potential number
of jobs in that sector are being capped by occupational licensing laws aimed at
helping pre-established businesses. 177
Beyond public opinion, and its effect on legislative bodies, is the judiciary.
The more that circuit courts come down affirmatively on one side or the other, the
more likely the Supreme Court will take notice of the growing nationwide split,
hear a similar case, and set a national standard, which will explicitly prohibit
protectionist occupational licensing schemes nationwide. Ideally, the Fifth Circuit
will affirm the district court’s decision and, like the Ninth Circuit, 178 set another
circuit court precedent supporting the Sixth Circuit’s Craigmiles decision.
Not everyone is so optimistic. Some argue that the Court is torn between the
“Court’s rhetoric, which still refers—accurately—to occupational freedom as a
constitutional right” and its holdings, “which no longer provide any meaningful
protection for that right and instead permit legislators to trample and abuse the
right with near total impunity.” 179 Others believe the victory for economic liberty
in the Craigmiles case did not go far enough: though the opinion talked about
protectionism as an illegitimate government interest, the opinion missed the
opportunity to comment on the “irrationality of requiring occupational training that
has nothing to do with one’s occupation.” 180 Critics of occupational licensing laws
have not forgotten the ugly, discriminatory history that many of those laws share;
some note that even today, the groups hit hardest by these laws are minority
entrepreneurs and those who come from low a socio-economic status. 181
One important fact worth conveying is that many prominent advocates of the
right to earn a living do not expect or wish to abolish occupational licenses
completely—for example, few people support less training and requirements for
heart or brain surgeons. 182 However, these specialized surgeons are generally
clear-cut examples of regulation in the interest of health and safety. Unfortunately,
many protectionist regulations are not clear-cut in this manner. An interior
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decorator is not a heart surgeon; a hair braider, not a brain surgeon. Many of these
occupations that are less intuitively linked with health and safety are the targets of
regulations that stretch the law as far as possible to benefit the interests of only a
few. Those occupational licensing laws are based upon a meritless “because I said
so” justification. This helps a select few, but leaves many hardworking, honest
entrepreneurs, who labor in harmless occupations, out in the cold. The circuit split
that exists today provides some hope that purely protectionist occupational licenses
will not stand.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Not even the savviest political theorist or legal historian can exactly define
what will happen to protectionist licensing schemes on a national level. The future
of anti-competitive licensing laws is yet to be determined. One thing is for certain:
the multi-circuit split surrounding protectionist occupational licensing schemes in
the funeral industry has grave consequences for entrepreneurs all across the
country in a vast range of occupations. When already-established businesses join
forces to keep new competitors out, they create excessive barriers to entry that
destroy countless potential jobs. To name a few, these barriers to entry come in
the form of expensive degrees, superfluous training, exorbitant fees, mandatory
full-time apprenticeships, and even “convincing” one’s competitors that new
business is necessary in their fields.
One of the greatest ironies is that many protectionist occupational licensing
regulations are enacted for the “consumer’s interest and protection.” In reality, the
effect of these licensing schemes is only to protect businesses that already exist.
These laws keep prices artificially high and allow businesses to reduce product
quality without suffering market consequences. Entrepreneurs and consumers
alike can remain hopeful that the ultimate and eventual resolution of the funeral
circuit split will overcome the problematic rational basis test and come down
against protectionism—in favor of economic liberty.

